INTRODUCTION
In 1976, I reviewed (84) two models which give alternative explanations for the adaptation of life history traits to stable and fluctuating environments. Deterministic models (r-and K-selection) predict that organisms exposed to high levels of densityindependent mortality, wide fluctuations in population density, or repeated episodes of colonization will evolve towards a combination of earlier maturity, larger broods, higher reproductive effort, and shorter lifespans than will organisms exposed to density-dependent mortality or constant population density (48, 65) . Stochastic models (58, 77) predict the evolution of the same combinations of life history traits, but for different reasons: when fluctuations in the environment result in highly variable juvenile mortality, then a syndrome of delayed maturity, smaller reproductive effort, and greater longevity should evolve.
Several years ago I set out to test these predictions by measuring the reproductive traits of two species of small fish that had been introduced to Hawaiian reservoirs in 1907 and 1922. Ambiguities appeared in the interpretation of the results, some of them inherent in the theory, others in the observations. I could not decide which of several possible causal systems had produced the pattern I observed. To determine what my results meant, I first tried to understand what life history data could mean in general, given the present state of our knowledge. In brief, the theory is not yet refined enough to be tested by crucial experiments that can pinpoint flaws. Under these circumstances, observation and experiment cannot falsify predictions definitively, but they can profitably arbitrate among the various simplifying assumptions that theorists may want to try out in their pursuit of unambiguous predictions that cleanly touch reality.
STEARNS
In this paper, I hope to demonstrate that the interpretation of data is ambiguous because the theory is incomplete. Theory can form the empiricists' search image, which then contains just as many unarticulated assumptions as does the theory. That is the subject of the first section of this essay. I then briefly list some of the obstacles to empirical work in the second section. In the third section, I review a representative sample of life history data, for two reasons. First, although there are difficulties relating theory and observation, the data show clearly that the number of types of life histories is limited. Thus hope for a general explanation of life history diversity is justified. Second, a review of life history diversity can itself challenge theorists by revealing the complex nature of the phenomena.
SOURCES OF AMBIGUITY IN THE THEORY
Students of life history evolution seek to explain variation in age at maturity, number of young, reproductive effort, size of young, and interbrood interval. Empiricists take one of two general approaches. On the one hand, they compare existing forms, assume that the conditions under which these forms are living represent the conditions under which they evolved, and test possible explanations against field observations. This, the comparative approach, often makes use of those interspecific or intergeneric comparisons that are subject to the pitfalls ably summarized by Lack (42) . Empiricists taking a direct approach, on the other hand, measure the selective difference between habitats and predict how life history traits should change if a population is introduced into one from the other. If the traits do not change as predicted, new theories are required. Placing evolutionary predictions at risk has not been popular. Evolution moves slowly and biologists are impatient. I believe that the logic of comparison is weaker than the logic of prediction, which should be used wherever feasible. The foundations of both will be strengthened by making explicit seven sources of ambiguity in the theory.
These ambiguities all share a general form. Each represents an unanalyzed complexity or subtlety, and for each we do not know whether explicit consideration of the problem would make any difference to our predictions. So long as we can accumulate confirmations of predictions that take real risks, we can continue on the assumption that these ambiguities make no difference. However, when falsifications force us to reconsider the assumptions, a skeptic could argue that the model failed to fit reality because it ignored or misrepresented one or more of these sources of ambiguity, and not because of the other features in the model with which we are usually concerned. Without relaxing his assumptions and examining the behavior of models that incorporate none of these complexities, without, in other words, showing that these ambiguities had no influence upon his predictions, one could not answer this objection. I call this the Dilemma of the Faustian Empiricist, who pursues the basis of his knowledge perhaps a bit too far for his own comfort.
These considerations should not inhibit theorists or empiricists, precisely because we do not yet know if they make any difference, and the only way we are going to find out is by testing energetically the interaction of theory and experiment. Gedanken experiment consists of endowing a series of clones with certain reproductive traits, putting them in competition, and seeing which one wins (e.g. 58). You may object that some models have successfully tied genetics to life history evolution. In fact, commendable efforts have been made, but no one has avoided these objections. Murphy (58), MacArthur (47), and Roughgarden (74) attempted to account for sex. They assumed that age at maturity and fecundity, or r and K, are so tightly associated genetically that they can be productively modelled as alleles at a single locus. Implicit in that approach is the necessity of assuming what one is trying to explain: the association of early maturity and high fecundity, or low r's and high K's. Charlesworth (13) generalized the one-locus-two-allele case to an age-structured population, thus considerably extending the realism attained by population genetics. The remaining difficulties appear intractable. For three reasons, we cannot generalize the one locus case to life history traits, most of which are influenced by many genes. First, as Wright (102) showed for pelage color of guinea pigs, the interaction of two or more loci can be wildly nonlinear. Second, the selective value of an allele at one locus can depend on the frequency of alleles at other loci, and always depends on whether the trait influenced by that allele is currently above or below the optimum value in the population at large (102). Third, evidence of two sorts indicates that changes in a few regulatory genes with large effects, rather than many structural genes with small, additive effects, and rearrangements of large blocks of genes determine large differences between species: (a) chimpanzees differ strongly from man in morphology, behavior, ecology, and life history traits, but are so nearly identical at electrophoretically detectable loci that the difference between chimpanzee and man for structural loci is less than the equivalent difference between pairs of sibling species of fruit flies or mammals (39); (b) differences in rates of anatomical, molecular, and chromosomal evolution between frogs and placental mammals indicate that there are two kinds of evolution: serum albumins in frogs and mammals have evolved at about the same rate, but chromosome number has changed 20 times faster in mammals than in frogs, paralleling the much greater anatomical diversity of placental mammals (100). These kinds of evidence convince me that detailed genetical models of life history evolution will have a strong flavor of unreality for some time to come, perhaps forever. If regulatory genes are preeminently important, if loci in general interact nonlinearly, and if linkage rearrangements result in more rapid evolution than changes in structural loci, then the assumptions of classical populations genetics are profoundly violated, and its generality is limited to the single locus case. Traits determined by single loci are rarely important to ecologists.
Another approach should clarify the point. Consider the way a population geneticist, who tries to deal with the complexities of diploid genetics, and a life history theorist, who usually does not, view the structure of evolutionary theory. One population geneticist (44) has posed as the general problem of evolution the understanding of four transformations within and between genotype space and phenotype space (Figure 1) . The initial distribution of genotypes in the population, G1, is transformed by the (as yet unknown) laws of ontogeny, TI, into the initial distribution of phenotypes, Pl. These phenotypes are not all equally fit, and T2 consists of the laws of ecology (as yet unknown) that determine the relative survival of phenotypes, resulting in the set of selected phenotypes, P2. T3, inverse epigenetic laws (as yet unknown), permit the inference of genotypes from phenotypes, giving us G2, the distribution of genotypes that underlies the P2 set of phenotypes. The partially understood rules of Mendel and Morgan, T4, produce the next generation of genotypes: the subject of theoretical population genetics. Lewontin's model poses the problem of evolutionary ecology with striking clarity: T1, T2, and T3 are not understood, and without them, knowing a bit about T4 is of little help. Life history theorists (and most other evolutionary ecologists) approach the problem a different way. They see associated with each transformation a surface structure of observables and a deep structure (the relationships embodied in the transformation rules) in terms of which they seek to explain the surface structure (85). In life history work (Figure 2) , the surface structure consists of individual organisms, their demographic and physiological characteristics, and a set of environmental measures that describe the conditions they encounter. Statistical inference connects the surface structure to an intermediate structure consisting of estimates of age at maturity, age-specific survivorship and fertility, growth rates, size of young, the time course of resource availability and weather, and so forth. The deep structure relates parameters that measure fitness, such as r, K, or the probability of leaving no young at all; these connect to the intermediate structure by such models as Lotka's demographic equation, the Lotka-Volterra equations, or analogous difference equations. Life history theorists do not isolate any of Lewontin's transformation sets cleanly. Life history theory is a set of optimality models; theoretical population genetics is a set of mechanistic models. They approach the problem of evolution in profoundly different ways. To make predictions about the relative survival of phenotypes, life history theorists ignore ontogeny (T1) and genetics (T4). This method is attractive because genotypes are not being continuously destroyed and reshuffled by sex, and because the complications of developmental plasticity and canalization can be ig- Nothing guarantees that the optimum point will be located in an accessible portion of phase space. For example, first, the chitinous exoskeleton of insects restricts growth and limits the number of eggs that can be carried at one time. Second, the water vascular system of echinoderms prevents colonization of land and, through osmotic constraints, of fresh water. Third, the complex interrelationships and multiple functions of mammalian hormones make the evolution of reversed sex roles in mammals difficult. None of these examples represent trade-offs between opposing selection forces. They are design barriers, limits beyond which organisms cannot operate. Design constraints should not be confused with trade-offs or costs, all of which share the characteristic that if the opposing selection force were removed, the phenotype would be free to move beyond the point already attained.
In the language of our model, this means that the fitness surface is dissected by barriers implicit in the design of particular groups of organisms. These barriers will be located in different places, and have different shapes, for different groups. What are the consequences? Consider Figure 3b . Here B is the optimum point, but the population started at A. The population cannot get from A to B because it runs into the barrier implied by design constraints. As the population evolves, it should travel upward along the fitness surface, following the high ground, as far as it can go, stopping at the barrier. If our theory were flawless, we could predict that a population should be at B; if we observed not-B, we could then state that its evolution had encountered a design constraint, and we could check for that. But our One could argue that the deterministic and stochastic approaches make the same predictions for the same environments. In a stationary population where resources are limiting and competition is fierce, variation in juvenile survival may be greater than variation in adult survival (32) . Similarly, in a population moving through a series of colonizing episodes, adult survival must vary considerably, perhaps much more than juvenile survival. One can suggest that the two approaches are dealing with the same phenomena at two different levels, as though there were two levels of deep structure in Figure 2 . This is essentially the point made by (99): "Because neither the carrying capacity nor the mechanism of population regulation is known for most natural populations, data on life history parameters are often consistent with more than a single hypothesis." I add that even if such knowledge were available, the data could still be consistent with more than a single hypothesis. A priori criteria can aid the choice among models that are empirically indistinguishable. Models couched in terms of the means and variances of adult and juvenile mortality rates would make more readily falsifiable predictions than models couched in terms of population regulation because their assumptions can be checked. [It may not be possible to distinguish density-dependent mortality from densityindependent mortality; see (72) ]. This approach would avoid the indefinable relationship between K and life history traits, and by making explicit the variability in juvenile and adult mortality, would make possible the examination of other fitness measures, such as the minimization of the probability of leaving no young at all. I find these advantages persuasive. Such a theory does not exist; its development should challenge us all.
STEARNS
The first three theoretical ambiguities afflict all models in evolutionary ecology. The remaining four are peculiar to life history theory.
The Assumption of a Stable Age Distribution
One must assume fixed age schedules of survivorship and fecundity to write an equation relating the elements of a life history to one measure of fitness, r. Because this is equivalent to assuming a temporally constant, spatially homogeneous environment, most graphical models make an analogous assumption. Although the stability of an age distribution is rarely checked (12), it is reasonable to assume that few, if any, natural populations have achieved it. Again, the dilemma is that of the Faustian Empiricist: A skeptic could always claim that the failure of the model to fit reality lay in its assumption of a stable age distribution, and not in any of its other features.
This criticism could be blunted by showing that the departures from stable age distribution were small [e.g. perhaps (97)], but where the mortality schedule has been shown to vary wildly (e.g. 57), the criticism retains considerable force. The only detailed theoretical analysis of populations not in stable age distribution (62) supports this point. In that model, population densities varied in a very surprising way, leading to unanticipated selection forces on life histories.
K as a Function of Life History Traits
Unlike r, K cannot be realistically expressed as a function of life history traits. Some of the most stimulating life history work has taken the following pattern. Let r be the measure of fitness, and examine its sensitivity to changes in age at maturity, fecundity, etc. Then predict that the trait to which r is most sensitive should be under the strongest selection pressure, should be found closest to its theoretical optimum (or against a design barrier), and should exhibit the least additive genetic variance of any of the traits (e.g. age at eclosion in Drosophila melanogaster). This process reduces life history traits to a common currency, units of r, and permits direct comparisons. These results lend plausibility to the idea that patterns of life history diversity have been influenced by chance historical events. In comparative work, the existence of either multiple stable endpoints or a broad distribution of possible outcomes results in terrible ambiguities. To make a precise and testable prediction in the first case, we would need to know not only the nature of the trade-off, which could be measured, but also the initial conditions, which can only be specified in manipulative experiments. In the second case, we would need a large number of well controlled replicates to discern the possibility of a strong stochastic effect. 
SOURCES OF DIFFICULTY IN OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT
In the foregoing I want to have suggested enough of the difficulties that afflict life-historical empiricists to convince you that published life history data are not reliable enough to justify any great faith in the generality of conclusions drawn from them. The review of published data in the next section will extend this point. Consider first, however, five problems which further compound our difficulties.
1. We often cannot identify the unit of evolution in the field. The spatial structure of most populations is almost impossible to observe, making it hard to measure the rate and direction of gene flow in nature.
For life history traits, on which selection is almost certainly operating, the degree of correspondence between the genetic component of the trait observed in the field and local environmental conditions will depend on the magnitude of local selection pressures, the rate of gene flow, and the nature of the average global selection pressure encountered by the whole interbreeding unit (Spieth, personal communication). When migration rate exceeds selection pressure, the local group must frequently be adapted to the entire spatiotemporal mosaic encountered by the panmictic unit, and any correlation between local environmental conditions and reproductive traits could be spurious.
2. There are severe technical problems with getting reliable life tables (12). Table 2 summarizes the theoretical and empirical sources of ambiguity just discussed. Each of the twelve items presents a worthy challenge. Overcoming or clarifying any would be significant. In certain cases, it would be profound.
SUMMARY OF SOURCES OF AMBIGUITY
The ideal organism for a complete life history study would have the following attributes. It should be possible (a) to define the boundaries of the field populations and to measure emigration and immigration rates; (b) to construct, by marking or aging, cohort life tables from field data with confidence limits on the mortality and fertility columns, and to measure the temporal component of the coefficient of variation in adult and juvenile mortalities, exclusive of measurement error; (c) to measure activity budgets in the field and energy budgets in the laboratory; (d) to achieve a relatively short (< 8 weeks) generation time in the laboratory; and (e) to make the organism forego reproduction (preferably in the field) and then to follow its subsequent survival.
These criteria, taken together, are quite restrictive, and adhering to them rigidly would preclude most of the interesting work that could be done. I do recommend against working on species for which none of the criteria could be satisfied. Investigators should focus on those questions for which most of the criteria can be met in a tractable species.
PUBLISHED EVIDENCE ON LIFE HISTORY DIVERSITY
This section evaluates present knowledge of diversity in life history traits for many taxa. In judging these papers by the criteria developed here and in the previous section, I am not implying that their authors have in some way failed; rather, I am trying to establish, on a uniform basis, what we do and do not know. Much of the work examined here was done before the field attained its current state of sophistication; and it would be unreasonable to criticize someone for not checking a point Tables I have indicated satisfaction of the criteria at three levels: "no" indicates that no attempt was made; "maybe" signals a good try whose data remain unconvincing; "yes" signifies a criterion completely satisfied. The review is organized by taxa. Table 3 summarizes the quality of data on salamander life history adaptation. This literature is strong in large field samples (criterion e) that demonstrate intra-and interspecific differences, but weak in measuring the factors on which explanations of life history diversity have been based (criteria b, c, and d) or on documenting the genetic basis of the diversity (criterion a). Only one of five salamander comparisons fits the accepted scheme. Five species of Desmognathus show unusual resistance to change, while Batrachoseps attenuatus has unusual developmental flexibility. The lizard data emphasize that rigorous definitions of reproductive effort can be made in the presence of year-to-year variability in mortality schedules and should be included in future studies. In a very thorough study, Tinkle & Hadley (94) measured the calories in reproductive effort per season for ten species, estimated the annual energy budgets for three species, and examined correlations of the reproductive data with age at maturity, with adult and juvenile survival rates, and with generation time. Only one correlation was significant: the ratio of clutch calories to body calories (a rough measure of reproductive effort) was negatively correlated with mean annual adult survivorship. The authors recognized that, had they been able to measure annual energy budgets for all ten species, there might have been less noise in their correlations. Of the three species for which they had estimates of the annual energy budgets, the one with delayed maturity and long life, Sceloporus graciosus, had the highest per season reproductive effort (0.23), while an essentially annual species, Uta stansburiana, made an intermediate effort (0.19). Sample sizes were small, and from too few populations to make the interspecific comparisons airtight. Nevertheless, these data, which are among the best available, force the conclusion that lizards do not neatly fit the accepted scheme.
Salamanders
All long-term studies of lizard populations have shown year-to-year variation in reproductive success (9, 22, 23, 89, 90, 96, 97, 103) , and certainly not all lizards that encounter such variability are late-maturing, with one clutch per season as Murphy's model would predict, e.g. Uta stansburiana (90, 96). Some of the variation in reproductive success stems from changes in fecundity, some from changes in mortality, and the relative contribution of each is hard to measure because of the difficulty in counting the number of clutches per season. It is possible, by judicious selection, to find series of both intra-and interspecific comparisons of lizards that fit the accepted scheme, but any attempt to fit all possible comparisons into the accepted scheme founders when the best-studied populations are examined.
Birds Table 5 
Mammals
The data on mammalian life histories (Table 6 ) are less reliable than the avian data. Convincing statistics on age at maturity are entirely missing, except for extremely broad comparisons, and virtually no comparative data exist on reproductive effort. Information is generally limited to litter size. The work done on the snowshoe hare stands out (e.g 36). It demonstrated a genetic component to geographical variation in litter size. Other than that, we know almost nothing about the coadaptation of age at maturity, litter size, longevity, and reproductive efforts in mammals. When such information is gathered, I suspect social systems and behavioral peculiarities will be shown to interact strongly with reproductive traits. Both technical problems and the confounding effects of complex behavior make it difficult to draw reliable conclusions about evolutionary causes from the avian and mammalian data. This largely descriptive work illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the comparative method. Its strength lies in suggesting hypotheses; its weakness lies in testing them. It cannot exclude alternative explanations, nor can it evaluate the relative impact of multiple causes. When one makes broad comparisons across either class, the accepted scheme emerges: Delayed maturity, small clutches, and long lives seem to come as a unit, as do early maturity, large clutches, and short lives. Where there are data available on mortality patterns, as for some seabirds (4), they are consistent with both deterministic and stochastic models. When intraspecific and intrageneric comparisons are examined, generalizations seem to vanish. Table 7 summarizes data on fish life histories. The fish literature is strong in field data with large sample sizes, but weak in attempts to measure explanatory environmental factors, degree of density-dependence, mortality rates, or reproductive efforts. It has suggested three points of broader significance. First, Murphy (58) arrived at his hypothesis (that the combination of delayed reproduction, low repro- ductive effort, and increased longevity adapts the organism to fluctuations in recruitment) through a consideration of fisheries data. That was the first alternative hypothesis suggested that deals with the same reproductive trend "explained" by rand K-selection. Second, nowhere is the impact of developmental plasticity more obvious than in fish. Growth rate, age at maturity, and fecundity are all very sensitive to temperature and food. This makes interpretation of field data difficult, and laboratory work necessary. Third, because of their broad range in fecundity and egg size, it was in fish that the trade-off between a few large young and many small young was first noted (86).
Fish

Insects
The outstanding characteristics of insect life history data (Table 8) Herbaceous flowering plants Table 9 In a provocative paper, Oka (59) examined inter-and intraspecific variability in the reproductive traits and phenotypic plasticity of wild (Oryza perennis) and domestic (0. sativa) rice. Under seminatural conditions annual forms had higher seed production, more soil-buried seeds, strong seed dormancy, less vegetative reproduction, and higher juvenile mortality than perennial forms. All annuals, of course, died after their first season of reproduction, but during that first reproductive period they experienced lower adult mortality rates than the perennials. These results roughly fit the accepted scheme, but go beyond it in emphasizing the broad range of reproductive adaptations in plants: Seed dormancy, vegetative reproduction, and developmental plasticity have to be considered.
In herbaceous plants the accepted scheme is not general, but does fit some cases. Sunflowers, goldenrods, dandelions (so far), and cattails seem to fit; grasses, milkweeds, and duckweeds do not. Wilbur (98) demonstrated that a more complex set of selective factors, accounting for predation, competition, and mortality, could explain more types of reproductive variability than r-and K-selection. Hickman (30) showed that all the reproductive variability observed among populations in the field could be due to developmental plasticity.
